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THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY IN AN EVER-CLOSER 
UNION
Tina Oršolić Dalessio*
Summary: This paper aims to answer the following question: what 
is the understanding of the principle of sovereignty in the EU today, 
and how should this knowledge inform our actions tomorrow? It is 
demonstrated that from both doctrinal and practical points of view, it 
is impossible to determine conclusively what sovereignty or its preser-
vation entails in the present European legal setting. The only point of 
clarity regarding the contemporary interpretation of sovereignty is that 
the principle should no longer be conceived in traditional and absolute 
terms – since this would be incompatible with the current European le-
gal and political reality. Yet, while there seems to be an agreement on 
what sovereignty is not, there is no agreement, in either legal doctrine 
or practice, on what this principle actually is. It is argued that such a 
deeply contested nature of sovereignty puts in question not only the 
role and strength of this principle, but also the adequacy of its use as 
a legal parameter for determining the boundaries of the European in-
tegration process. It is thus concluded that in legal debates concerning 
the future of the EU, arguments relying on sovereignty should not be 
taken at face value. Rather, they should be approached with a critical 
eye and with full awareness of the disputed nature of the principle 
they rest upon.
1. Introduction 
Sovereignty and the safeguarding thereof have been the subject of 
heated debates since the beginning of European integration. Some have 
used it as an argument in favour of quantitative and qualitative expan-
sion of the European Union, others as an argument against it, and others 
still have dismissed sovereignty as an outdated legal construct. All of this 
has, in turn, generated confusion regarding the contemporary under-
standing of the principle of sovereignty in the European legal context. 
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The aim of this paper is to determine what the present stance on the 
principle of sovereignty in the EU from a legal point of view is, and what 
lessons this teaches us for the future. In particular, the author will seek 
to find out how legal doctrine and legal practice conceive sovereignty in 
Europe today, and how this should inform our debate tomorrow. 
In order to uncover the contemporary legal understanding of sover-
eignty in Europe, the author will first look at the doctrinal take on this 
principle and its development. She will then turn to the relevant judicial 
practice dealing with the principle of sovereignty and its safeguarding in 
the European integration context. 
It will be shown that both in legal doctrine and practice, the principle 
of sovereignty is surrounded by much dispute and ambiguity. The only 
point of clarity and consensus seems to consist in the rejection of the old-
fashioned, inflexible understanding of sovereignty conceived in terms of 
absolute and indivisible powers. Yet, while both legal scholars and practi-
tioners seem to agree on what sovereignty does not comprise, there is no 
agreement on how this principle should be properly construed. 
The author will argue that the vagueness and confusion surround-
ing the principle of sovereignty is instructive in several ways. First, the 
profoundly disputed and diluted character of sovereignty puts into ques-
tion the role, strength and credibility of this legal principle. By extension, 
such a nature of sovereignty raises the issue of the potency and per-
suasiveness of arguments based on this principle. That is to say, due to 
the fundamental ambiguity and disagreement surrounding sovereignty, 
references to this principle seem to obscure, rather than clarify, the legal 
answers to practical questions faced in the European integration process. 
Second, the deeply contested nature of the principle of sovereignty 
raises doubts about the adequacy of its use as a legal parameter for 
deciding the present and the future of the European Union. As things 
stand, the principle of sovereignty provides fertile grounds for arbitrary 
and non-transparent decision-making. Its acknowledged profoundly dis-
puted character and the possibility of endorsing its conflicting interpre-
tations depending on the circumstances and interests involved render it 
an ideal instrument for passing policy judgments under the pretence of 
legal objectivity. 
This teaches us an important lesson. Arguments based on sover-
eignty should not be taken for granted – especially not when they are 
aimed at steering the European integration process. Rather, they should 
be approached with caution, awareness of the vagueness of the principle 
they rest upon, and an understanding that its varying, yet equally feasi-
ble, interpretations can generate conflicting results of legal analysis. 
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2. Sovereignty in legal doctrine 
The concept of sovereignty was first comprehensively elaborated by 
Jean Bodin in his famous Les Six livres de la République dating back to 
1576. Bodin described sovereignty as an absolute, indivisible and per-
petual power of giving law and issuing commands to all in general and to 
each in particular.1 This power, according to him, exists ‘without consent 
of any other’.2 
Bodin’s account of sovereignty was more prescriptive than descrip-
tive, more of an ideal than the actual depiction of the distribution of pow-
ers in sixteenth-century France.3 At the time it was made, this theory was 
meant to serve a practical political purpose – it was envisaged as a way 
of strengthening the French monarchy in the circumstances of the severe 
political crisis caused by the wars of religion.4 Yet, as the circumstances 
have since changed, so has the understanding of sovereignty. 
Most scholars nowadays agree that Bodin’s theory of sovereignty 
comprises fatal flaws.5 As Eleftheriadis explains, Bodin’s account of sov-
ereignty is viewed as a descriptive failure since it fails to capture the 
fluidity and elusiveness of political power.6 In addition, Bodin’s theory of 
sovereignty is regarded as a normative failure as its fails to provide con-
vincing reasons why we should be at the mercy of the absolute sovereign 
prince.7 
Yet, while there seems to be rather wide agreement amongst legal 
scholars regarding the inadequacy of Bodin’s conception of sovereignty, 
there is no agreement on what is the adequate, proper account of sover-
1 See Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth 
(Julian H Franklin ed, CUP 1992) book 1, chs 8 and 10. 
2 ibid 56. Bodin clarified that the power of making and repealing law entails all the other 
rights and prerogatives of sovereignty. Particularly, it includes the power of declaring war 
and making peace, establishing principal officers of state, judging in last instance, granting 
pardons and dispensations against the rigour of the law, coining money, fealty and liege 
homage, and laying taxes on subjects, or exempting some of them. See ch 10.
3 Edward Andrew, ‘Jean Bodin on Sovereignty’ (2011) 2(2) Republics of Letters 75, 84 <http://
arcade.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/article_pdfs/roflv02i02_Andrew_060111_0.pdf> 
accessed 8 October 2014
4 ibid. 
5 See Pavlos Eleftheriadis, ‘Law and Sovereignty’ 1 <http://www.trinitinture.com/docu-
ments/eleftheriadis2.pdf> accessed 8 October 2014. Also see Julian H Franklin, ‘Sover-
eignty and the Mixed Constitution: Bodin and his Critics’ in JH Burns and M Goldie (eds), 
Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450–1700 (CUP 1995) 298.
6 See Eleftheriadis (n 5) 1. As Raz argued nearly half a century ago, sovereignty can be 
divided into, as well as shared between, separate, non-subordinate bodies. See Joseph Raz, 
The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System (Claredon Press 
1980) chs I and II. See also Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Philosophical Founda-
tions of European Union Law (OUP 2012) 85. 
7 Eleftheriadis (n 5) 1.
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eignty. In other words, while most scholars seem to agree on what sover-
eignty is not, they fail to agree on what it is. 
The lack of consensus on the proper interpretation of the principle of 
sovereignty in European legal doctrine started to evolve shortly after Bo-
din presented his theory. Following his explanation of what sovereignty 
is (or should be), this legal construct evolved in two ways, broadly speak-
ing. In continental Europe, Bodin’s original account transformed into the 
principle of popular sovereignty, while in Great Britain it took the form of 
the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.8  
The principle of popular sovereignty was developed under the influ-
ence of contractarian theories and the 18th century American and French 
Revolutions.9 In particular, it was Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s social con-
tract theory that largely defined the contours of this principle, also known 
as the sovereignty of the people.10 
Unlike Thomas Hobbes who had previously argued that individuals, 
by entering society, give up their sovereignty entirely in favour of a prince 
who then becomes an absolute sovereign,11 Rousseau’s vision of the social 
contract was more liberal. According to Rousseau, the people, as sover-
eign, retain the ultimate power to impose the laws while delegating the 
power to enforce them to the Government/the Prince.12 The Government, 
thus, represents merely a minister of the sovereign people, who review its 
accountability and renew its mandate.13 Opposite to Hobbes’ theory under 
which it could be said that the state ‘swallows’ the people, under Rous-
seau’s social contract theory, the people ‘swallow’ the state through the 
exercise of the general will.14 As a result, the principle of the sovereignty 
of the people finds solid ground and justification under the latter theory.
Thus, the idea underlying the principle of popular sovereignty is that 
people represent the ultimate source of political and legal authority with-
in a state territory. This principle, in other words, is based on the belief 
8 See Bruno de Witte, ‘Sovereignty and European Integration: The Weight of Legal Tradi-
tion’ in Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet and JHH Weiler (eds), The European Court 
and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing 1998) 279.
9 ibid.
10 See Ken Endo, ‘Subsidiarity and its Enemies: To What Extent Is Sovereignty Contested in 
the Mixed Commonwealth of Europe?’ (2001) EUI Working Paper RSC No 2001/24, 5, 27; 
András Jakab, ‘Neutralizing the Sovereignty Question: Compromise Strategies in Constitu-
tional Argumentation before European Integration and Since’ (2006) 2 EuConst, 375, 377.
11 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (CB Macpherson ed, Penguin Books 1968) ch XVIII.
12 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings (Vic-
tor Gourevitch ed, CUP 1997) book III, ch I.
13 ibid.
14 Alain de Benoist, ‘What is Sovereignty?’ (Julia Kostova tr) taken from ‘Qu’est-ce que la 
souveraineté?’ (1999) 96 Éléments 24, 104.
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that ‘all political and legal power ought to rest on the will and consent of 
those among and over whom power is exercised’.15 
Regardless of possible nuances in its interpretation, it can be con-
cluded that this understanding of sovereignty and all its varying applica-
tions ultimately belong to the theory of democracy.16 What therefore lies 
at the core of popular sovereignty is the affirmation of the people’s right to 
self-determination and self-governance,17 exercised through their rights 
to democratic participation and representation. 
In this regard, it is worth noting that popular sovereignty does not 
imply or presume the existence of any constitutional state organ enjoying 
sovereignty.18 On the contrary, it is the absence of the latter that ‘forces 
us to identify the people as the ultimate possessor of the sovereignty of 
their state’.19
On the other hand, when it comes to the second main ‘successor’ 
of Bodin’s original idea of sovereignty in Europe, things are quite dif-
ferent. Under the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, or at least its 
legal conception, it is recognised that sovereignty resides precisely in 
an institution.20 As apparent from its very name, the principle of parlia-
mentary sovereignty suggests that Parliament is ‘the repository of legal 
sovereignty’.21 More specifically, in the case of Great Britain, it suggests 
that the Parliament composed of three bodies acting jointly – the House 
of Commons, the House of Lords and the monarch22 – possesses supreme 
legal power to make or unmake any law.23 
This principle, dominant in Great Britain, implies furthermore that 
no body or person has the right to override, hold invalid or set aside the 
legislation of Parliament.24 The only legal limitation of Parliament’s legis-
lative power is that ‘a parliament of today cannot, with legislation, bind a 
15 Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Com-
monwealth (OUP 1999) 130.
16 ibid.
17 Popular sovereignty can, in MacCormick’s words, be described as ‘sovereignty as self-
determination’ ibid 134.
18 ibid 130.
19 ibid 131. However, as MacCormick further explains, for the people to count as the ulti-
mate possessor of sovereignty, there needs to exist some constitutional grounding. 
20 de Witte (n 8) 279.
21 MacCormick (n 15) 133.
22 When acting together, these three bodies are referred to as the ‘King in Parliament’ (cur-
rently, the ‘Queen in Parliament’). See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: 
History and Philosophy (Clarendon Press 1999) 9; and Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution (Liberty Fund 1982) 3.
23 Dicey (n 22). 
24 ibid 3, 4. See also Goldsworthy (n 22) 10.
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parliament of tomorrow’.25 That is to say, Parliament must be at liberty to 
ignore its own previous laws whenever it passes a new one.26 This is also 
known as the doctrine of implied repeal.
Just as with any other legal principle, there are certain disagree-
ments as to parliamentary sovereignty’s defining features, such as its ori-
gins, the exact extent of the permissible legislative self-restraint and the 
possibilities of expounding this concept in the future.27 However, regard-
less of these differences in interpretation, it can be more or less unequiv-
ocally concluded that the orthodox legal understanding of parliamentary 
sovereignty,28 unlike its rival conception of popular sovereignty, suggests 
that people are not and could not be considered as sovereign.29 The peo-
ple, that is, the electoral body, have only the right to elect the members of 
Parliament and can only express themselves legally through Parliament 
and in no other manner.30 
Regardless of their points of divergence, however, both the principle 
of parliamentary sovereignty and that of popular sovereignty have expe-
rienced serious challenges in the past century. This was due to the pro-
found changes that European nation-states and their legal systems have 
gone through. 
25 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Dialogues in the European Community’ in Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet and JHH Weiler (eds), The European Court and National Courts, 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in Its Social Context (Hart Publishing 1998) 316. 
See also, for example, Joaquin Varela Suanzes, ‘Sovereignty in British Legal Doctrine’ 
(1999) 6(3) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 39; and Goldsworthy (n 22) 16.
26 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (CUP 2010) 289.
27 For an account of these disagreements, see Goldsworthy (n 26). See also Tina Oršolić, 
‘Book Review of Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates’ 
(2011) 7 European Constitutional Law Review 336.
28 Albert Venn Dicey’s elaboration of parliamentary sovereignty is frequently perceived as 
the orthodox understanding of this principle. See Goldsworthy (n 26) 288. See also Kenneth 
A Armstrong, ‘United Kingdom – Divided on Sovereignty?’ in Neil Walker (ed), Sovereignty in 
Transition (Hart Publishing 2006).
29 Suanzes (n 25) 38.
30 ibid. This, consequently, implies that British courts will take no notice of the will of the 
electorate. See Dicey (n 22) 28. Dicey, however, acknowledges that ‘the electors are a part 
of and the predominant part of the politically sovereign power’ 29 (emphasis added). Thus, 
if sovereignty is considered strictly as a political, rather than a legal, concept, it may be 
said that the electors, together with the Crown and the Lords, constitute the body in which 
sovereign power is vested 27. In a political sense, the concept of sovereignty under the Brit-
ish legal tradition therefore appears somewhat closer to the basic postulates of the concept 
of popular sovereignty. Dicey himself admits that the legal and the political meaning of 
the word sovereignty are, in reality, at least equally important 28. However, he also clearly 
states that the two conceptions, even though intimately connected, are essentially differ-
ent and must not be confused. This is precisely the point around which Dicey’s criticism of 
John Austin’s theory of sovereignty evolves 26-29. For a more detailed account of Austin’s 
theory of parliamentary sovereignty, see John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Deter-
mined (2nd edn, Burt Franklin 1970) lecture VI. For a distinction between legal and political 
sovereignty, see further Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty in Conflict’ (2004) 8(15) European 
Integration online Papers 8-9 <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-015.htm> accessed 8 
October 2014.
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The consequences of the two bloodiest and deadliest events of the 
last century – the First and the Second World War – played the main role 
in bringing about these changes. These wars taught Europeans a painful 
and important lesson: independent national dominions cannot provide 
sufficient guarantees of peace and prosperity for the people who inhabit 
them. In order to realise these ideals, something more is needed – some-
thing extending beyond the national sphere.
Learning this hard lesson has led to the introduction of various in-
ternational law mechanisms aimed at protecting human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, establishing basic humanitarian law standards and 
promoting international cooperation.31 Moreover, it marked the beginning 
of the project that will forever change the face of Europe – the project of 
European integration.   
Over the course of time, the project of European integration has 
grown in size and scope, turning into a Union that inseparably ties the 
economies, the politics and the peoples of its Member States. The growth 
and strengthening of the European Union have facilitated the flow of 
goods, services, persons and capital across national borders and have 
attracted a growing membership. Its expansion has ensured the desired 
attainment of its core objectives – peace, stability and economic growth in 
post-war Europe. Yet, all of this has come at a certain cost. The gradual 
development of an ever-closer Union implies the increasing transfer of 
competences from the national to the supranational level. 
Early on, the European Court of Justice described the legal system 
of this growing Community as ‘a new legal order of international law for 
the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign right, albeit 
within limited fields’.32 Nowadays, however, there is widespread anxiety 
that these fields are limited no more.33 Some even claim in this context 
that there is simply no nucleus of sovereignty that the Member States can 
invoke, as such, against the European Union.34
Notwithstanding its positive outcomes, the development of the Eu-
ropean integration project has thus created serious challenges for those 
promoting and believing in the idea of sovereign European nation-states. 
It has revealed that absolute or unitary sovereignty is entirely absent from 
the political and legal setting of the European Union.35 More specifically, 
31 Most notably, the United Nations and the Council of Europe legal mechanisms negitio-
ated in the aftermath of the Second World War.
32 See Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1.
33 Joseph HH Weiler, ‘Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg’ (2001) Har-
vard Jean Monnet Working Paper No 10/00, 5.
34 See ibid, citing Koen Lenaerts, ‘Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism’ 
(1990) 38 American Journal of Comparative Law 205, 220.
35 MacCormick (n 15) 132.
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it has made it clear that neither politically nor legally is any EU Member 
State in possession of ultimate power over its own internal affairs, or is it 
fully sovereign externally.36 And neither is the European Union.37 
The unique European experiment in intertwining national and su-
pranational spheres has therefore exposed traditional conceptions of sov-
ereignty, which sought to lock and confine sovereign powers within na-
tional borders, as unsuitable and unsustainable. The choice was either 
to give them up entirely, or yet again readapt the principle of sovereignty 
to the new circumstances in which the EU Member States now operate. 
While some scholars seem to have chosen the former path, others have 
opted for the latter. 
Hence, we find those who deem the European integration process 
as a cause of the demise of sovereignty in Europe and who welcome the 
idea of the European sovereignty-free reality. One of the most articulate 
defenders of the post-sovereign position in the European integration con-
text is Neil MacCormick.38 MacCormick has famously argued that the re-
cent developments in Europe have taken us ‘beyond the sovereign state’ 
and towards the era of ‘post-sovereignty’.39 He has elaborated in this re-
gard that sovereignty is ‘like virginity, something that can be lost by one 
without another’s gaining it – and whose loss in apt circumstances can 
even be a matter of celebration’.40 Accordingly, he welcomed ‘the prospect 
of Europe beyond sovereign statehood’.41 
More radically, some scholars altogether reject the idea of sovereign-
ty and hold that clinging onto this concept is misguided and possibly 
dangerous. Eleftheriadis has, for instance, on these lines suggested that 
the survival of the idea of sovereignty is a mistake, since it cannot be ad-
justed to fit the age of rights and constitutions.42 According to him ‘sover-
eignty is and has always been incompatible with the idea of law’, and its 
survival is purely ‘the result of some kind of absent-mindedness on the 
part of our constitutional lawyers’.43
Still, while some bid adieu to or outright reject sovereignty, others 
continue to recognise its value. Consequently, we witness a growing vol-
ume of scholarly work that seeks to reinterpret, readapt or altogether 
reinvent the principle of sovereignty. The common goal of such scholarly 
36 ibid.
37 ibid.
38 Neil Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’ in Neil Walker (ed), Sovereignty in 
Transition (Hart Publishing 2006) 15.
39 MacCormick (n 15) ch 8. 
40 ibid 126.
41 ibid.
42 See Eleftheriadis (n 5).
43 ibid 3, 4.
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endeavours is to better fit the principle of sovereignty into the contem-
porary European legal and political context. Most novel interpretations 
emerging as a result of these efforts recognise sovereignty’s continued 
existence in the EU, albeit in a more fluid form and at both levels of gov-
ernance.44 
Some examples of such interpretations are the conceptions of pooled, 
shared, mixed, divided, split or partial sovereignty.45 These metaphors of 
‘disaggregation and reaggregation’ are all deployed in order to grasp the 
poly-centred character of the new European configuration of authority.46 
Broadly speaking, these conceptions portray the sovereignty of EU Mem-
ber States as something that has not been lost, but subjected to a pro-
cess of division and combination.47 
However, ‘the attributions of divisibility, alienability, compossibil-
ity and mixity’ were found by some to sit uneasily with the very sense 
of sovereignty.48 Thus, given their perceived downsides, several scholars 
have proposed other innovative accounts of sovereignty. For instance, 
Neil Walker advances the conception of late sovereignty,49 Miguel Maduro 
the idea of competitive sovereignty,50 and Samantha Besson the notion of 
cooperative sovereignty.51 Despite their points of divergence, these novel 
understandings of sovereignty in the EU share a common thread and 
convey a similar message. They are all aimed at reconciling the principle 
of sovereignty with the European reality of constitutional pluralism and, 
for that purpose, insist on the importance of mutual dialogue and the 
adaptation of sovereign authorities at different levels of governance.52 
Thus, and notwithstanding some scholars’ abandoning of sover-
eignty in the contemporary European legal context, the list of alternative 
doctrinal approaches to this legal principle continues to grow. With its 
growth, the dispute regarding the proper interpretation of the principle of 
sovereignty grows deeper still. 
44 In this context, one is bound to wonder whether diluting a concept to the extreme for the 
sake of preserving it is not somewhat counterproductive.
45 See Walker (n 38) 14-15. 
46 ibid.
47 MacCormick (n 15) 133.
48 Walker (n 38) 15. See also de Witte (n 8) 172. De Witte has argued in that sense that if 
sovereignty is divided, it loses its distinguishing trait.
49 See de Witte (n 8). 
50 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Ac-
tion’ in Walker, Sovereignty in Transition (n 38).
51 Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty in Conflict’ (2004) 8(15) European Integration online 
Papers  <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-015.htm> accessed 8 October 2014.
52 See Samantha Besson, ‘Book Review of Neil Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition’ (2005) 
3 International Journal of Constitutional Law <http://doc.rero.ch/record/32876/files/
The_Taming_of_Sovereignty.pdf> accessed 8 October 2014.
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As things currently stand, one can only conclude that from the point 
of view of legal doctrine, we keep getting farther and farther from an agree-
ment regarding the meaning and relevance of the principle of sovereignty. 
The only point of consensus and clarity would seem to be that wherever 
we are in terms of conceiving sovereignty and its place in today’s world, 
this place is far from where we once started. Therefore, if there is such 
a thing as sovereignty in the current European legal context, it appears 
that it can no longer be accurately envisaged in Bodin’s terms, as an ab-
solute, indivisible and perpetual power of lawmaking. 
3. Sovereignty in legal practice 
The question remains of what legal practice, as opposed to legal doc-
trine, tells us about the contemporary understanding of the principle of 
sovereignty in the EU. Have judges managed to provide more clarity with 
regard to this principle or are things just as messy in legal practice as 
they are in legal doctrine?
One should first notice that the question of safeguarding sovereignty 
in the context of European integration has long been present in judicial 
practice. In fact, this question has proven central to the national consti-
tutional review of EU law amendments by the highest tribunals of various 
EU Member States. Thus, in order to determine what the current stance 
on sovereignty is from the point of view of legal practice, one is bound to 
look at this line of national constitutional case law.  
Thus far, nine highest national courts have engaged in an assess-
ment of the constitutionality of primary EU law amendments. In the 
course of this review, all of them have insisted on the preservation of the 
core of sovereignty of their respective states in the process of European 
integration.53 
Chronologically, the first to put such emphasis on the need to pro-
tect national sovereignty in the European integration context was the 
Irish Supreme Court in its landmark judgment Crotty v An Taoiseach.54 
Shortly afterwards, this court’s approach was followed by the French Con-
stitutional Council in the Maastricht I case,55 the German Federal Consti-
53 For a detailed analysis of this judicial approach, see Tina Oršolić Dalessio, Socializing 
Europe – Solidifying EU Citizneship (Wolf Legal Publishers 2013) ch II.
54 Crotty v An Taoiseach [1987] IESC 4 [1987] IR 713 (9 April 1987) <http://www.bailii.
org/ie/cases/IESC/1987/4.html> accessed 8 October 2014.  
55 For an English translation, see the French Constitutional Council’s Decision 92-308 
DC of 9 April 1992, Treaty on European Union (French Maastricht I case) <http://www.
conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/english/case-law/case-law.25743.
html>accessed 8 October 2014. 
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tutional Court in its famous ‘Maastricht-Urteil’56 and the Danish Supreme 
Court in its Maastricht case.57 Following subsequent Treaty amendments, 
the French Constitutional Council, the Danish Supreme Court and the 
German Federal Constitutional Court have again had a chance to review 
primary EU law amendments for their compatibility with national con-
stitutional principles and norms.58 On every occasion, these courts have 
asserted the importance of the principle of national sovereignty and its 
safeguarding in the process of European integration.59 Specifically, they 
have made it clear that the European Union project can go only as far as 
it does not infringe upon the core national sovereign powers. 
It did not take long before other national tribunals followed this 
trend of conditioning present and future EU law developments upon the 
preservation of national sovereignty. The Spanish Constitutional Court 
applied a similar reasoning in its decision on the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe.60 And, more recently, this ‘sovereignty-related’ 
approach was also applied in the Lisbon Treaty judgments of the Czech 
56 See Manfred Brunner and Others v European Union Treaty (German Maastricht case) 
(1994) 1 CMLR 57. 
57 See the English annotation by Sten Harck and Henrik Palmer Olsen, ‘Decision Concern-
ing the Maastricht Treaty 1998 Ugeskrift for Retsvaesen, H 800’ (1999) 93(1) American 
Journal of International Law 209. 
58 See the English translations of the French Constitutional Council’s Decision 97-394 
DC of 31 December 1997, Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, 
the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related instruments; the 
French Constitutional Council’s Decision 2004-505 DC of 19 November 2004, Treaty estab-
lishing a Constitution for Europe, both available at <http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/
conseil-constitutionnel/english/case-law/case-law.25743.html> accessed 8 October 2014 
and its Decision 2007-560 DC of 20 December 2007, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (French Lis-
bon Treaty case) <http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/english/
case-law/case-law.25743.html> accessed 8 October 2014. See also the Danish Supreme 
Court Case No 199/2012, Judgment of 20 February 2013 (Danish Lisbon Treaty) Section 
3<http://www.domstol.dk/hojesteret/nyheder/ovrigenyheder/Documents/199-12en-
gelsk.pdf> accessed 8 October 2014, and the German Federal Constitutional Court’s Case 
BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr (1 - 421) (German Lisbon Treaty) <http://
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html> 
accessed 8 October 2014.
59 For a detailed analysis, see Oršolić Dalessio (n 53).
60 For an English translation, see Case 6603-2004 before the Spanish Tribunal Constitu-
cional (Spanish EU Constitutional Treaty) (2005) 1 CMLR 39. That ‘national sovereignty is 
vested in the Spanish people’ was also affirmed by the Spanish Constitutional Court in its 
Maastricht case, when the Court was setting the parameters for a review of the compatibil-
ity of the Maastricht Treaty with the Spanish Constitution. See Part II, para 3 of the Eng-
lish translation of the Spanish Constitutional Court’s Declaration 1/1991 of 1 July 1992 
<http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/fr/jurisprudencia/restrad/Pages/DCC11991en.
aspx> accessed 8 October 2014.
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Constitutional Court,61 the Latvian Constitutional Court,62 the Hungar-
ian Constitutional Court63 and the Polish Constitutional Tribunal.64 
While this clearly confirms that sovereignty represents one of the 
crucial national constitutional principles, the safeguarding of which be-
comes particularly important in the European integration context, it does 
not yet clarify what the contemporary legal understanding of this princi-
ple is from the practical point of view. The question thus remains: have 
judges managed to provide us with a clearer and more uniform interpre-
tation of the principle of sovereignty than legal scholars have?
The answer is unfortunately negative. The above-mentioned judg-
ments illustrate that the ambiguity and dispute surrounding the prin-
ciple of sovereignty is just as present in legal practice as it is in legal 
doctrine. The only point of consensus from a practical point of view seems 
to be that sovereignty can no longer be conceived in rigid terms as an 
absolute and high-handed concept. 
The latter has been confirmed by a number of the highest national 
tribunal decisions reviewing the compatibility of primary EU law amend-
ments with national constitutional principles and norms. 
The French Constitutional Council has, in its Maastricht I judgment, 
affirmed that France may, subject to reciprocity, consent to limitations of 
its sovereignty that are necessary for the organisation and preservation of 
peace.65 According to the Constitutional Council, this means that France 
may conclude international agreements aimed at participating in the es-
tablishment or development of a permanent international organisation 
that enjoys legal personality, as well as decision-making powers on the 
basis of transfers of powers agreed upon by the Member States.66 
The Danish Supreme Court adopted similar reasoning in its decision 
concerning the Maastricht Treaty.67 It ruled that a delegation of sovereign 
61 See the English translation of the Czech Constitutional Court’s Decision Pl ÚS 19/08 
of 26 November 2008 (Czech Lisbon Treaty) <http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/?tx_
ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=484&cHash=621d8068f5e20ecadd84e0bae0527552> accessed 8 
October 2014. 
62 See the English translation of Case 2008-35-01 before the Constitutional Court of Latvia 
(Latvian Lisbon Treaty) (2010) 1 CMLR 42.
63 See the Press Release on Decision 143/2010 (VII 14) AB of the Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of Hungary on the constitutionality of the Act of promulgation of the Lisbon 
Treaty <www.mkab.hu/letoltesek/en_0143_2010.pdf> accessed 8 October 2014.  
64 See the English translation of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment K 32/09 
of 24 November 2010 (Polish Lisbon Treaty) <http://trybunal.gov.pl/fileadmin/content/
omowienia/K_32_09_EN.pdf> accessed 8 October 2014.
65 See French Maastricht I case (n 55) para 11. 
66 ibid, para 13.
67 To be more exact, this decision dealt with the question of the constitutionality of the 
ratification and the incorporation into Danish law of the Maastricht Treaty. See the English 
annotation by Harck and Palmer Olsen (n 57) 209. 
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powers to a community of states, such as the EU, is permissible in rela-
tion to international authorities established by mutual agreement with 
other states and for the promotion of international rules of law and coop-
eration.68 The implicit message behind these courts’ reasoning seems to 
be that ‘a State can limit or transfer competences, precisely because it is 
a sovereign State’.69
Similarly, the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) asserted 
that it is fully permissible for the Federal Republic of Germany to become 
a member of a community of states that acts on its own in sovereign mat-
ters and that has the right to exercise independent sovereign powers.70 
According to the GFCC, the needed conferral of sovereign powers on such 
a community of states will necessarily result in the exercise of these pow-
ers no longer being dependent solely on the will of one Member State.71 
This means that it is not incompatible with the principle of sovereignty 
for the German legislature to engage in a far-reaching transfer of sover-
eign powers to the EU. More recently, this was confirmed and addition-
ally clarified in the GFCC’s Lisbon Treaty judgment. There, the Court 
proclaimed that not only does the German Basic Law support Germany’s 
participation in an integration of states such as the EU, but that it ‘aban-
dons a high-handed concept of sovereign statehood that is sufficient unto 
itself’.72
The Czech Constitutional Court’s (CCC) Lisbon Treaty case recently 
further substantiated the conclusion on the abandoning of the tradition-
al, rigid understanding of sovereignty in legal practice. In elaborating the 
meaning of state sovereignty, the CCC asserted that a transfer of state 
competences at the EU level does not represent a conceptual weakening 
of state sovereignty. On the contrary, according to the CCC, it can lead 
to its strengthening, so long as such a transfer of powers is based on 
the sovereign’s free will and is conditioned by the sovereign’s participa-
tion in the integration in a manner previously agreed upon and that is 
reviewable.73 In that regard, the CCC explicitly sought to renounce the 
traditional, rigid understanding of sovereignty, which presupposes the 
independence of state power from any other power, in both external and 
internal matters.74 Correspondingly, it confirmed that it is fully in ac-
cordance with the constitutional principle of sovereignty for the Czech 
68 Carlsen v Rasmussen (Danish Maastricht case) (1999) 3 CMLR 854, para 9.8. 
69 Solange Mouthaan, ‘France: Amending the Amended Constitution’ (1998) 23(6) EL Rev 
592, 596.
70 See German Maastricht (n 56), paras 36, 37.
71 ibid, para 37.
72 See German Lisbon Treaty (n 58) para 223.
73 See Czech Lisbon Treaty (n 61) para 108. 
74 ibid, para 107. 
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Republic to join and take part in an integration of states such as the EU, 
which requires a transfer of certain sovereign powers to supranational 
institutions. 
The earlier Spanish Constitutional Court’s decision on the Treaty es-
tablishing a Constitution for Europe applied a similar approach.75 While 
affirming the principle of state sovereignty, the Spanish Constitutional 
Court acknowledged that the Spanish Constitution allows for the consti-
tutional transfer of powers to the EU.76 The same was done by the Con-
stitutional Court of Hungary in its Lisbon Treaty decision, which affirmed 
that it is possible for the holder of sovereignty, that is, the Hungarian 
legislator, to limit the exercise of the attributes of sovereignty.77
Yet another example of such an approach can be found in the Lisbon 
Treaty judgment of the Constitutional Court of Latvia.78 While recognis-
ing the principle of sovereignty as one of the fundamental values upon 
which the State of Latvia is based,79 this Court clarified that the transfer 
of certain state powers to the EU should be regarded as the exercise of 
sovereignty of the people rather than its dilution.80 The transfer of (at 
least some) competences to the supranational level is thus fully compat-
ible with the constitutional principle of sovereignty.
In the most recent Lisbon Treaty judgment, the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal (PCT) applied a similar argument and further elaborated it. In 
setting the parameters for review, the PCT first declared that sovereignty 
could no longer be perceived as an absolute and unrestricted power free 
from external influences, since the freedom of state activity is now sub-
jected to various restrictions imposed by international law.81 According to 
the PCT, these restrictions are particularly visible in the case of the EU 
legal order, given the binding character of EU law and its direct impact 
on internal relations between the Member States, as well as the broader 
scope of competences that the Union enjoys in comparison with other 
international organisations.82 However, instead of regarding it as a limi-
tation of state sovereignty, the PCT argued that membership in the EU 
and the assumed obligations should be viewed as a manifestation of state 
75 For an English translation, see Case 6603-2004 before the Spanish Tribunal Constitu-
cional (Spanish EU Constitutional Treaty case) (2005) 1 CMLR 39.
76 ibid, para 37.
77 See Press Release (n 63).  
78 See the English translation of Case 2008-35-01 before the Constitutional Court of Latvia 
(Latvian Lisbon Treaty) (2010) 1 CMLR 42.
79 ibid, para 173.
80 ibid, para 225.
81 See Polish Lisbon Treaty (n 64) point 2.1. 
82 ibid.
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sovereignty.83 This, according to the PCT, follows from the fact that EU 
membership has allowed the Member States to extend their activities into 
fields where they had not been present before.84 
Simply put, all these judgments confirm that highest national courts 
have renounced the inflexible, high-handed conception of sovereignty, 
by allowing for a transfer of sovereign powers to the supranational level. 
This comes as no surprise from either the doctrinal or practical point of 
view. As explained above, nearly all legal scholars nowadays agree that 
sovereignty can no longer be conceived as an absolute, indivisible and 
perpetual power of lawmaking. In this regard, the ‘looser’ interpretation 
of the principle of sovereignty in judicial practice, or at least its negative 
meaning, seems to correspond to how it is understood in legal doctrine. 
Besides, this kind of interpretation of the national constitutional 
principle of sovereignty would appear to be the only legally and politically 
viable one. Legally, the courts’ choice was limited by the texts of their own 
respective constitutions, which explicitly allow for the transfer of powers 
from national to the supranational level.85 Politically, their choice was 
limited since any other, more rigid interpretation of the principle of sover-
eignty would have doomed the project of European integration to failure. 
Yet, despite the courts’ renouncement of the old-fashioned under-
standing of this principle, they did nonetheless insist on preserving the 
essence or core of national sovereignty in the process of European in-
tegration. This raises the question: if sovereignty should no longer be 
conceived in traditional and absolute terms, how exactly should it be 
construed from a practical point of view? In that regard, what do the core 
national sovereign powers consist of and what does their preservation 
imply? 
Regrettably, the national case law reviewing Treaty amendments 
for their compatibility with national constitutional laws does not provide 
83 ibid.
84 In that regard, the Court has also stressed that EU membership has not led to a per-
manent limitation or loss of sovereign rights of the Member States, given the fact that they 
have merely assumed an obligation to jointly conduct state duties in areas of cooperation, 
that the conferral of state competences on the Union is not irrevocable, that the Member 
States maintain the ultimate competence to ‘determine competences’, as well as the fact 
that Member States’ constitutions, which are the manifestations of state sovereignty, retain 
their significance (ibid).
85 See Article 10a of the Czech Constitution, Article 20 of the Danish Constitution, Article 
88.2 of the French Constitution, Article 24 of the German Basic Law, Article 2/A of the 
Hungarian Constitution, Article 68 of the Latvian Constitution, Article 90 of the Polish Con-
stitution and Article 93 of the Spanish Constitution. For further discussion, see de Witte 
(n 8) 150-155; and Monica Claes, ‘The Europeanization of National Constitutions in the 
Constitutionalisation of Europe: Some Observations Against the Background of the Consti-
tutional Experience of the EU-15’ (2007) 3 CYELP 1.
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much clarity in this respect. Rather, it exposes a world of ambiguity sur-
rounding the principle of sovereignty in legal practice. 
To begin with, the majority of the courts which relied on the principle 
of sovereignty in their reviews of primary EU law amendments have failed 
to elaborate what exactly this principle entails. Most of these analysed 
cases thus leave it entirely up in the air as to which core features of sov-
ereignty national governments and legislators should seek to preserve in 
the process of European integration. 
While this is regrettable from the perspective of the achievement 
of legal clarity and certainty, it is not particularly surprising. The rea-
son for the reluctance of the highest national courts to clarify what the 
principle of sovereignty comprises lies precisely in its ambiguous char-
acter. This was explicitly acknowledged by one of the national tribunals 
which relied on sovereignty in its constitutionality review of primary EU 
law amendments – namely, the Czech Constitutional Court in its Lisbon 
Treaty judgment. In particular, the Czech court explained that due to the 
fact that state sovereignty constitutes a highly disputed term and a very 
difficult one to define in the abstract, it would refrain from its detailed 
interpretation in its judgment.86 
Interestingly, however, and despite its acknowledgement of such a 
nature of sovereignty, the Czech Constitutional Court nonetheless en-
gaged in a rather elaborate discussion of the contemporary meaning of 
this principle in its Lisbon Treaty case. The German Federal Constitu-
tional Court and the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, in the course of their 
review of Lisbon Treaty amendments, have done the same. 
The conclusion one can draw from these judicial attempts to pro-
vide an interpretation of sovereignty is that different courts may have 
a different understanding of this principle. Moreover, and more confus-
ingly, these examples from judicial practice would seem to suggest that 
not only in different jurisdictions do different conceptions of sovereignty 
apply, but also that several different conceptions of sovereignty may be 
operating within one single jurisdiction.
An indicative example of this is the Czech Lisbon Treaty case, in 
which the Czech Constitutional Court recognised what appear to be dif-
ferent understandings of sovereignty. Specifically, in its judgment, the 
Czech Court acknowledged the conception of sovereignty of the people,87 
the sovereignty of the Member States,88 and, supposedly, in that con-
86 See para 98 of the Czech Lisbon Treaty case (n 61). 
87 ibid, eg paras 93, 209.
88 ibid, para 102.
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text, the sovereignty of the Czech Republic as a state,89 the conception of 
pooled sovereignty,90 and the conception of practical sovereignty.91 Yet, 
in line with its recognition of the disputed character of sovereignty and 
the difficulty of defining it in the abstract, the Czech Court refrained from 
providing an explanation of the exact terms of each of the mentioned con-
ceptions. As a result, the Czech Lisbon Treaty case leaves us in doubt as 
to what the principle of sovereignty means from the perspective of Czech 
constitutional law and in the particular context of European integration. 
This, unfortunately, is not where the confusion and uncertainty re-
garding the contemporary meaning of the principle of sovereignty in legal 
practice ends. Aside from the inventive invocations of different concep-
tions of sovereignty by a single court in a single judgment, what causes 
further ambiguity is the fact that different courts seem to endorse what 
appear to be different interpretations of one (seemingly) overarching con-
ception of sovereignty. 
The most indicative examples of this, in relation to the conception 
of popular sovereignty, can be found in the Czech, Polish and German 
Lisbon Treaty cases. These courts seem to recognise two contemporary 
understandings of the sovereignty of the people: one grounded on the 
right to collective self-determination, and the other grounded on the right 
to individual self-determination.
First, there is the conception of popular sovereignty grounded on the 
right to collective self-determination and the supporting theory of neces-
sary state tasks, traces of which can be found in the Polish and the Ger-
man Lisbon Treaty cases.92 According to this understanding, the sover-
eignty of the people reflects and manifests itself in the right of the people 
as a collective, as a national political community, to self-determination. 
This collective right to self-determination is considered to be exercised 
through democratic participation and representation rights, allowing the 
people as a whole to voice their political interests and concerns through 
representative state institutions. It is considered that, by exercising their 
democratic rights, people authorise representative state organs to protect 
and advance their self-determinative choices through the performance of 
so-called necessary state tasks. Performance of these vital functions by 
state organs is, in turn, regarded as an affirmation of the people’s right 
to self-determination and a consequent confirmation of their sovereign 
powers. 
89 ibid, para 209.
90 ibid, para 104.
91 ibid, para 107.
92 See also Jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A Response (Polity Press 
2012) 17-18.
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Despite the fact that the people as a collective are seen as the ulti-
mate holders of sovereignty, under this conception the focus of normative 
concern shifts towards the state, its organs and their regulatory powers. 
This follows from the understanding that the sovereign powers of the peo-
ple are expressed primarily through the performance of necessary state 
tasks by national institutions. What thus matters under this conception 
of popular sovereignty, especially in the European integration context, is 
the retention of these vital competences in the hands of the state. Their 
transfer to the supranational level would, under this understanding, re-
sult in an impermissible limitation or even loss of the sovereignty of the 
people. 
In their recent Lisbon Treaty rulings, the Polish and the German con-
stitutional courts seem to have endorsed this particular understanding 
of popular sovereignty. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal explained that 
the sovereignty of the Republic of Poland implies a ‘confirmation of the 
primacy of the Polish Nation to determine its own fate’ and is ‘expressed 
in the inalienable competences of the organs of the state’.93 The Ger-
man FCC, similarly, elaborated that safeguarding sovereignty requires 
restricting the transfer of sovereign powers at the EU level, particularly in 
central areas that shape citizens’ economic, cultural and social circum-
stances of life.94 This has, in turn, led these courts to engage in quite a 
detailed description of what these non-transferable and vital state com-
petences entail.95 
While this understanding of the sovereignty of the people focuses 
on the performance of inalienable, necessary state tasks by state organs, 
the alternative rests on a different set of premises. Under this alternative 
understanding of popular sovereignty, individuals and their self-determi-
native rights, rather than necessary state tasks, are placed at the centre 
of normative concern. According to this liberal conception, popular sov-
ereignty finds a grounding in the right to individual self-determination, 
which is considered to pertain to the sphere of human dignity and free-
dom.96 More precisely, under this conception, what stands at the core of 
the sovereignty of the people is the right of every individual to freely deter-
93 See point 2.1 of the Polish Lisbon Treaty case (n 64).
94 See paras 248, 249, 251 of the German Lisbon Treaty case (n 58).
95 For a more detailed account of this unprecedented exercise in defining necessary state 
tasks and the resulting criticism in academia, see Daniel Halberstam and Christoph 
Möllers, ‘The German Constitutional Court Says “Ja zu Deutschland!”’ (2009) 10(8) Ger-
man Law Journal 1241.
96 See further Jürgen Habermas, ‘Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Con-
tradictory Principles?’ (2001) 29(6) Political Theory 766; and Jürgen Habermas, The Crisis 
of the European Union: A Response (Polity Press 2012) 18. See also Nico Krisch, Beyond 
Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (OUP 2010) 92-94, 99, 282.
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mine his or her own personal fate.97 This right is ultimately considered to 
be based on the basic rights of individuals to human dignity and freedom. 
By the same token, the rights to democratic representation and partici-
pation, enabling individuals to exercise their right to self-determination, 
are also seen as derivatives of those basic rights.98 
What thus matters under this liberal conception of popular sover-
eignty is the protection of rights to individual self-determination, dignity 
and freedom. Whether these rights are granted and protected at the na-
tional or the supranational level makes no difference in terms of advanc-
ing the sovereignty of the people. Therefore, rather than requiring the 
retention of certain necessary tasks at the national level, this under-
standing of the sovereignty of the people supports legal regulation in any 
given policy field and at any given level of governance, as long as such 
regulation advances self-determinative choices and prerogatives of indi-
viduals, and boosts their human dignity and freedom.
Amongst other conceptions of sovereignty, the Czech Constitutional 
Court in its Lisbon Treaty case seemed to have recognised this conception 
of popular sovereignty. This is seen in its description of human freedom 
and human dignity as values that form the foundation of a human be-
ing’s self-determination,99 and in its interpretation of the sovereignty of 
the people as a mechanism built to protect ‘inherent, inalienable, non-
prescriptible, and non-repealable fundamental rights and freedoms of 
individuals, equal in dignity and rights’.100 Yet, as mentioned before, the 
CCC also relied on other conceptions of sovereignty, making it hard to 
determine exactly how the principle of sovereignty should be construed 
under Czech constitutional law. 
As for the supranational counterpart of the highest national tribu-
nals – the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) – and its un-
derstanding of the principle of sovereignty in the European integration 
context, it is hard to discern what exactly it consists of. Unlike in the case 
of the Czech Constitutional Court, this is not due to the CJEU’s endorse-
ment of what appear to be different conceptions of sovereignty. Rather, 
this is due to the CJEU’s unwillingness to address the issue of sovereign-
ty in the EU and to elaborate its own understanding of this principle.101 
97 Consequently, ‘the people’ are under this conception understood as a self-determining 
community of free and equal citizens rather than a monolithic collective. See Habermas, 
‘Constitutional Democracy’ (n 96) 778.
98 As Habermas explains, under this conception, we ‘conceive democratic self-determina-
tion as an uncoerced process of ethical-political self-understanding undertaken by a popu-
lace accustomed to freedom’. Habermas, ‘Constitutional Democracy (n 96) 771.
99 Para 103 of the Czech Lisbon Treaty case (n 61).
100 ibid, para 93.
101 de Witte (n 8) 154-155.
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The only conclusion one can draw from its case law is that the CJEU 
seems to share the national courts’ view on the negative meaning of this 
principle. That is to say, the CJEU seems to agree that the principle of 
sovereignty should not be conceived in high-handed and absolute terms. 
Rather, in the context of European integration, it should be interpreted 
as allowing for the possibility of limitation and transfer of sovereign pow-
ers – at least to a certain point. 
This view is substantiated by the CJEU’s landmark judgments Van 
Gend en Loos and Costa v ENEL, in which the formula used was that 
the Member States have limited their sovereign rights for the benefit of 
the European Union and its institutions, albeit within limited fields.102 
Yet, while this provides further proof of the renouncement of an inflex-
ible conception of sovereignty, and therefore confirms what the current 
understanding of sovereignty is not, it tells us little about what it is in 
today’s European legal context.
It can thus be concluded that the profound vagueness and dispute 
concerning the contemporary understanding of the principle of sover-
eignty exists virtually at the same degree in legal practice as it does in 
legal doctrine. The only point of clarity and consensus regarding this 
principle would seem to concern its negative meaning. Accordingly, sov-
ereignty should no longer be envisioned in Bodin’s original terms as an 
absolute, indivisible, and perpetual power of lawmaking. How it should 
be properly construed in the present European legal context, unfortu-
nately, remains far from settled.
4. Conclusion
In light of the unceasing trend to invoke the principle of sovereignty 
in debates regarding the scope, size and content of the European integra-
tion project, the aim of this paper was to answer what we know about the 
understanding of sovereignty in the EU today, and how this knowledge 
should inform our actions tomorrow.
It has been shown that from both a practical and doctrinal point of 
view, it is impossible to determine conclusively what sovereignty is con-
sidered to comprise in the present European legal context. This is not 
only made implicit through the various divergent interpretations of this 
principle in legal doctrine and judicial practice. It is also made explicit by 
the scholarly acknowledgement of the profoundly disputed character of 
102 See Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, 12; and Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] 
ECR 585, 593. See also de Witte (n 8) 154-155.
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the notion this principle rests upon,103 as well as by the judicial acknowl-
edgement of the difficulty of defining the term sovereignty in the abstract. 
The only point of clarity regarding the contemporary interpretation 
of sovereignty is that the principle should no longer be conceived in tra-
ditional, inflexible and absolute terms, since this would be incompatible 
with the current European legal and political reality. Yet, while there 
seems to be an agreement regarding the negative meaning of sovereignty, 
we are far from reaching one regarding its positive meaning. 
The principle of sovereignty thus remains a phantom chameleon 
straddling the territories of legal doctrine and constitutional practice. 
While this does not per se render it dangerous, it does put into question 
the role, strength and credibility of this curious creature. By extension, 
it puts into question the potency and persuasiveness of arguments that 
rely on it. Namely, due to its acknowledged ambivalent and highly dis-
puted character, references to sovereignty would seem to muddle and 
weaken, rather than support and clarify, legal answers to any practical 
problems associated with moral legitimacy.   
Besides providing a feeble basis for constructing legal arguments, 
the profoundly diluted and disputed character of sovereignty also casts 
doubt on the adequacy of using this principle as a legal parameter for 
determining the future of the European integration project. Since the am-
biguity and disagreement surrounding sovereignty can facilitate the use 
of its divergent conceptions, reliance on this principle can easily generate 
opposing legal claims depending on the context and interests that one 
seeks to protect.104 
103 Besson has, in that regard, argued that ‘the concept of sovereignty not only amounts to 
a complex and normative concept, but also that it is an essentially contestable concept. As 
such, it is a concept that not only expresses a normative standard and whose conceptions 
differ from one person to the other, but whose correct application is to create disagreement 
over its correct application or, in other words, over what the concept is itself’. Samantha Bes-
son, ‘Sovereignty in Conflict’ (2004) 8(15) European Integration online Papers, 6 <http://
eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-015.htm> accessed 8 October 2014. See also Dan Sarooshi, 
International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers (Oxford Monographs in 
International Law Series, OUP 2005); and Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner (eds), Sover-
eignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept (CUP 2010). On 
the vague and complex character of the notion of sovereignty, see also Anneli Albi and Peter 
Van Elsuwege, ‘The EU Constitution, National Constitutions and Sovereignty: An Assess-
ment of a “European Constitutional Order”’ (2004) 29(6) EL Rev 741, 755-6; Roland Bieber, 
‘An Association of Sovereign States’ (2009) 5 EuConst 391 399; de Benoist (n 14) 99; Bernd 
Krehoff, ‘Legitimate Political Authority and Sovereignty: Why States Cannot be the Whole 
Story’ (2008) 14 Res Publica 283, 288-9.
104 For a detailed explanation of how divergent conceptions of sovereignty can generate op-
posing results of legal analysis, in the context of a national constitutional review of EU law 
amendments, see Oršolić Dalessio (n 53) ch III.
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As such, the principle of sovereignty provides an ideal tool for arbi-
trary, incoherent and non-transparent policy-making under the pretence 
of legal neutrality. As some authors have already observed, sovereignty 
is not only too vague to be a helpful decision-making tool when deciding 
how we should deal with any particular problem which confronts us,105 
but it is also ripe for political exploitation and is, in fact, often used for 
that exact purpose.106 
Such a deeply ambiguous nature of sovereignty and the ongoing dis-
pute surrounding it teaches us an important lesson: legal arguments 
that rely on this principle should not be taken at face value. Rather, 
they should be approached with extreme caution, a critical eye and full 
awareness of their open-ended potential. This should especially be done 
in cases where the principle of sovereignty is used as a legal standard of 
review capable of redefining the entire course of European integration.107
105 Konrad Schiemann, ‘Sovereignty: A Concept Creating Confusion’ (Eutopia Law, 11 
March 2013) <http://eutopialaw.com/2013/03/11/sovereignty-a-concept-creating-confu-
sion/> accessed 2 October 2014. Although Schiemann referred to the notion of sovereignty 
when he argued this, the quotation seems to fit, since his argument can be easily extended 
to the principle of sovereignty, which rests on this very notion.
106 Jessica Simor, ‘Sovereignty: The Historical Perspective; or ‘les absents ont toujours tort’ 
(Eutopia Law, 7 March 2013) <http://eutopialaw.com/2013/03/07/sovereignty-the-
historical-perspective-or-les-absents-ont-toujours-tort/#more-1809> accessed 2 October 
2014. 
107 This is not to suggest that the notion of sovereignty should be given up in its entirety. 
The appeal of resorting to sovereignty-related rhetoric in public discourse will surely per-
sist, given its strong traditional, emotional and symbolic overtone. It would be somewhat 
naïve to expect this to change due to any arguments of law or logic. Yet, when it comes to 
legal arguments and decisions capable of changing the entire course of European integra-
tion, expectations are different. Because of the immediate and real impact that such deci-
sions may have on people’s lives, they should be made prudently and transparently. A sug-
gestion to abandon sovereignty-based arguments in legal discourse should thus be further 
explored.
